Surveys, tutorials & ethics
Entry points to the field and the principles behind it.
- A Game-theoretic Taxonomy and Survey of Defensive Deception for Cybersecurity and PrivacyJ. Pawlick, E. Colbert, Q. ZhuACM Computing Surveys 52(4), 2019
- Game Theory for Cyber Deception: A TutorialQ. ZhuHoTSoS 2019 (ACM)
- Game Theory Meets LLM and Agentic AI: Reimagining Cybersecurity for the Age of Intelligent ThreatsQ. ZhuarXiv 2025
- The Doctrine of Cyber Effect: An Ethics Framework for Defensive Cyber DeceptionQ. ZhuarXiv 2023
- Strategic Learning for Active, Adaptive, and Autonomous Cyber DefenseL. Huang, Q. ZhuIn Adaptive Autonomous Secure Cyber Systems, Springer, 2020
Signaling & Bayesian deception
Beliefs, evidence and information asymmetry.
- Modeling and Analysis of Leaky Deception Using Signaling Games With EvidenceJ. Pawlick, E. Colbert, Q. ZhuIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 14(7), 2019
- Dynamic Bayesian Games for Adversarial and Defensive Cyber DeceptionL. Huang, Q. ZhuIn Autonomous Cyber Deception, Springer, 2019
- Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cyber Deception: Evidence-Based Strategies and Dynamic Risk MitigationT. Zhang, L. Huang, J. Pawlick, Q. ZhuIn Modeling and Design of Secure Internet of Things, Wiley-IEEE, 2020
- Manipulating Adversary’s Belief: A Dynamic Game Approach to Deception by Design for Proactive Network SecurityK. Horák, Q. Zhu, B. BošanskýGameSec 2017, LNCS
- Hypothesis Testing Game for Cyber DeceptionT. Zhang, Q. ZhuGameSec 2018, LNCS
- A Game-Theoretic Foundation of Deception: Knowledge Acquisition and Fundamental LimitsT. Zhang, Q. ZhuarXiv 2018
- Phishing for Phools in the Internet of Things: Modeling One-to-Many Deception using Poisson Signaling GamesJ. Pawlick, Q. ZhuarXiv 2017
- Proactive Defense Against Physical Denial of Service Attacks Using Poisson Signaling GamesJ. Pawlick, Q. ZhuGameSec 2017, LNCS
- Game-Theoretic Neyman-Pearson Detection to Combat Strategic EvasionY. Hu, J. Chen, Q. ZhuIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2025
Honeypots & attacker engagement
Luring, observing and engaging attackers over time.
- Adaptive Honeypot Engagement Through Reinforcement Learning of Semi-Markov Decision ProcessesL. Huang, Q. ZhuGameSec 2019, LNCS
- Farsighted Risk Mitigation of Lateral Movement Using Dynamic Cognitive HoneypotsL. Huang, Q. ZhuGameSec 2020, LNCS
- Duplicity Games for Deception Design With an Application to Insider Threat MitigationL. Huang, Q. ZhuIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 16, 2021
- Optimal Timing in Dynamic and Robust Attacker Engagement During Advanced Persistent ThreatsJ. Pawlick, T. T. H. Nguyen, E. Colbert, Q. ZhuWiOpt 2019
APTs & moving target defense
Multi-stage threats and defenses that keep moving.
- A Dynamic Games Approach to Proactive Defense Strategies against Advanced Persistent Threats in Cyber-Physical SystemsL. Huang, Q. ZhuComputers & Security 89, 2020
- On Multi-Phase and Multi-Stage Game-Theoretic Modeling of Advanced Persistent ThreatsQ. Zhu, S. RassIEEE Access, 2018
- A Receding-Horizon MDP Approach for Performance Evaluation of Moving Target Defense in NetworksZ. Qian, J. Fu, Q. ZhuIEEE CCTA 2020
- When to Deceive: A Cross-Layer Stackelberg Game Framework for Strategic Timing of Cyber DeceptionY.-T. Yang, Q. ZhuarXiv 2025
Deception in AI & LLM agents
Deception by and against learning systems, language models and agentic AI.
- Generative-Conjectural LLM Equilibrium for Agentic AI Deception with Applications to SpearphishingQ. ZhuGameSec 2025, LNCS
- A Gestalt Game-Theoretic Framework for Designing Agentic AI Workflows in Cyber DeceptionM. A. Al Bari, Q. ZhuGame Theory and AI for Security, LNCS, 2025
- Symbiotic Game and Foundation Models for Cyber Deception Operations in Strategic Cyber WarfareT. Li, Q. ZhuIn Foundations of Cyber Deception, Springer, 2025
- LLM-Stackelberg Games: Conjectural Reasoning Equilibria and Their Applications to SpearphishingQ. ZhuarXiv 2025
- LLM Semantic Signaling Game and Mechanism Design: Systematic Blindness, Awareness Shaping, and Mindset DynamicsQ. ZhuarXiv 2026
- Deceptive Reinforcement Learning Under Adversarial Manipulations on Cost SignalsY. Huang, Q. ZhuGameSec 2019, LNCS
- Manipulating Reinforcement Learning: Stealthy Attacks on Cost SignalsY. Huang, Q. ZhuIn Game Theory and Machine Learning for Cyber Security, Wiley-IEEE, 2021
Cognitive security & phishing
Human attention, bias and the psychology of deception.
- ADVERT: An Adaptive and Data-Driven Attention Enhancement Mechanism for Phishing PreventionL. Huang, S. Jia, E. Balcetis, Q. ZhuIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 17, 2022
- RADAMS: Resilient and Adaptive Alert and Attention Management Strategy against Informational Denial-of-Service (IDoS) AttacksL. Huang, Q. ZhuComputers & Security, 2022
- Combating Informational Denial-of-Service (IDoS) Attacks: Modeling and Mitigation of Attentional Human VulnerabilityL. Huang, Q. ZhuGameSec 2021, LNCS
- Game of Travesty: Decoy-based Psychological Cyber Deception for Proactive Human AgentsY. Hu, Q. ZhuarXiv 2023
- Human Risks and Cognition-Inspired Adaptive Cyber DeceptionY.-T. Yang, Y. Ge, Q. ZhuIn Foundations of Cyber Deception, Springer, 2025
- Bi-Level Game-Theoretic Planning of Cyber Deception for Cognitive ArbitrageY.-T. Yang, Q. ZhuarXiv 2025
- Guarding Against Malicious Biased Threats (GAMBiT) Experiments: Revealing Cognitive Bias in Human-Subjects Red-Team Cyber Range OperationsB. Beltz et al., incl. Q. ZhuarXiv 2025
Cyber-physical & robotic deception
Deception in drones, vehicles, robots and navigation.
- A Dynamic Game Framework for Rational and Persistent Robot Deception With an Application to Deceptive Pursuit-EvasionL. Huang, Q. ZhuIEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering 19(4), 2022
- Strategic Defense Against Deceptive Civilian GPS Spoofing of Unmanned Aerial VehiclesT. Zhang, Q. ZhuGameSec 2017, LNCS
- PRADA: Proactive Risk Assessment and Mitigation of Misinformed Demand Attacks on Navigational Route RecommendationsY.-T. Yang, H. Lei, Q. ZhuIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2025
- Game-theoretic Foundations for Cyber Resilience Against Deceptive Information Attacks in Intelligent Transportation SystemsY.-T. Yang, Q. ZhuIn Autonomous Cyber Resilience, Wiley, 2026
Mechanism & information design
Choosing what to reveal, conceal or commit to.
- On the Price of Transparency: A Comparison Between Overt Persuasion and Covert SignalingT. Li, Q. ZhuIEEE CDC 2023
- Commitment with Signaling under Double-sided Information AsymmetryT. Li, Q. ZhuarXiv 2022
- Transparent Tagging for Strategic Social Nudges on User-Generated MisinformationY.-T. Yang, T. Li, Q. ZhuIEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering, 2025
- A Stackelberg Game Perspective on the Conflict Between Machine Learning and Data ObfuscationJ. Pawlick, Q. ZhuIEEE WIFS 2016